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CHAPTER 1
Courses of democratization in East Asia 
A contribution to the debate...
Adam W. Jelonek
As it is widely assumed, the overthrow of Salazar’s dictatorship in Portugal in 
1974 after the Carnation Revolution triggered the third world wave of democ­
ratization. Starting in the south of Europe, the ‘third wave’ spread rapidly, and 
swept across Latin America and Asia. In the 1990s, it reached the countries of 
Eastern Europe and a part of Africa.1 Many previously authoritarian countries 
quickly started to fill in the emerging ideological void with liberal-democratic 
values. Thus, they rejected, formally at least, other non-democratic alterna­
tives of legitimacy of their governments. Some of the supporters of liberal 
democracy even started to optimistically assume that the democratic rule may 
have been recognized as the only possible form for the modern societies.2 
Then, Francis Fukuyama prophetically stated that the history of mankind 
ended with the era of bipolar ideology. According to Fukuyama, the trium­
phant Western model of liberal democratization was to become the dominant 
form in the sphere of political organization, and no notion of its alternatives 
was possible in the future.3
1 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth 
Century, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991, p. 15.
2 Marc F. Plattner, The Democratic Moment, in: Larry Diamond and Marc F. 
Platt ner (eds.). The Global Resurgence of Democracy, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Uni­
versity Press, 1993, p. 30.
3 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and The Last Man, New York: Free Press, 
1992, p. 45.
Apart from the ongoing discourse on the declining dynamics of democra­
tization processes in the modern world, it should be noted that even in its 
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global peak, the processes of the ‘third wave’ had never become a model that 
would describe the fundamental trends occurring in the political systems of 
East Asia. Attributing priority meaning to economic development, with a si­
multaneous strong presence of the factor of nationalism in the public sphere, 
contributed to the fact that a considerable part of non-democratic Asian coun­
tries issued a challenge to the ‘Western’ visions of doing politics. Therefore, in 
the 1990s in Asia, theses on the distinctness of ‘Asian values’ were popular. 
They were supposed to be an alternative to liberal values of Western commu­
nities. Political leaders of East Asia repeatedly stood publicly by the thesis that 
following the Western developmental model was not only possible, but it was 
also an alternative to the Asian political and economic model of development.'1 
Once these opinions were supplemented with the famous hypothesis of Samuel 
P. Huntington that the post-cold-war conflicts would more often be a result of 
cultural diversity and, therefore, take the place of old ideological and econom­
ic divisions, one could suppose that the debate on the model of political trans­
formation would dominate the contacts between the West and the East-Asian 
civilization. One could also expect that it would indirectly influence peace and 
order of the future international community.
4 Alan Dupont, “Is There an ‘Asian Way’,” Survival, Vol. 38, No. 2/1996, pp. 
13-33.
5 Amartya Sen, “Democracy as a Universal Value,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 10, 
No. 3/1999, p. 15.
Can the ‘Asian values’ threaten the progress of the process of global de­
mocratization? Opinions on this matter have always been dissenting. Certain 
Asian scholars, like Amartya Sen, claim that democracy is a cosmopolitan val­
ue.4 5 According to these scholars, the fact that the leading figures on the Asian 
political scene maintain the illusion of incompatibility of the Far-Eastern de­
velopmental model with the rules of liberal democratization is, to say the least, 
inappropriate. As a matter of fact, Sen claims, questioning the purposefulness 
of democratization by certain politicians is a sole result of the attempt to 
counteract to the rising pressure on reforms of the system of power in their 
own countries. In this way, some of them also tried to make their authoritarian 
regimes and the Western systems of power equal, by often supplementing the 
term ‘democracy’ with numerous ‘adjectives.’ The core of the democratic sys­
tem in terms like ‘Confucian democracy,’ ‘state-controlled democracy,’ and 
‘Asian democracy' succumbs, therefore, to a permanent distortion. In many 
East Asian countries - Taiwan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand in 
particular - rapid economic growth led to a relatively rapid transformation of 
the functioning of the social model. The increase of investments, improvement 
of living conditions, greater social dynamics, and improvement of educational 
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standards may, however, be directly related to the initial successes of democ­
ratic transformation. Although East Asia is a long way from a stable consolida­
tion of democratic structures, the processes may define a permanent direction 
for the region’s political systems.6
6 Guillermo O’Donnell, Transitions, Continuities, and Paradoxes, in: Scott Main- 
waring, Guillermo O’Donnell and J. Samuel Valenzuela (eds.), Issues in Democratic 
Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective, Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1992, p. 18.
7 L. H. M. Ling and Chih-yu Shih, “Confucianism with a Liberal Face: The 
Meaning of Democratic Politics in Postcolonial Taiwan," The Review of Politics, Vol. 60, 
No. 1/1998, pp. 55-82.
’ Donald K. Emmerson, “Singapore and the ‘Asian Values’ Debate,” Journal of 
Democracy, Vol. 6, No. 4/1995, pp. 95-105; Yi-Huah J iang, “Asian Values and Communi­
tarian Democracy,” International Workshop on Deliberating the 'Asian Value Debate: National 
Values, Chinese Values and Muslim Values in Southeast Asia, Taipei 1998, p. 18.
However, this optimistic vision is not shared by all. Naturally, elements of 
cultural tradition by no means stop the progress of democratization processes 
in some of the Asian counties. However, as L. H. M. Lin and Chih-yu Shih sug­
gest, the ‘Confucianism with a liberal face’ is a more suitable definition of the 
nature of East-Asian democracy. According to them, democratization processes, 
even if progressing, in general openly conflict with the systems of values. 
Hence, the result of political transformation in the countries of the region still 
remains unknown, while currently it is difficult to determine the proportion 
between the influence of, to some extent, native Confucian tradition and the 
influence of the European set of liberal values.7 *The attempts to determine the 
fate of democratization in Asia are additionally hampered. Donald K. Emmer­
son draws attention to methodological problems with determining the set of 
values typical for this particular region. Asia’s cultural diversity makes it im­
possible to put all Asian countries in one logical set, and give them a common 
collective identity.’
Although the future of democratization processes in Asia cannot be fully 
predicted, one might focus on a less ambitious question, i.e. the influence of 
traditional systems of values on the dynamics of political transformation 
processes in the region. One should consider how strongly the modernization 
and democratization force transformation, and particularly how great an ob­
stacle can Confucianism be for the democratization of the states of the region.
Three theoretical perspectives
Three basic analysis trends aiming at explaining the nature of mutual relations 
between traditional Asian values based on Confucianism and political modern­
ization and democratization processes may be pictured. These are the mod­
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ernization perspective, concept of cultural relativism, and opinions referring 
to communitarianism
Supporters of the first model assume that differences in political solutions 
introduced in the Eastern and Western countries will slowly diminish, as a 
result of the global modernization processes. Although the supporters of mod­
ernization allow for the theoretical part of the ‘multitude of modernities’ con­
cept, the ongoing discourse on political transformation is invariably dominat­
ed by the supporters of a homogeneous model of political modernity, identi­
fied with the Western model of democracy. One of the most famous followers 
of this vision - Francis Fukuyama - referring to the processes occurring in Asia 
claims that all changes in political institutions (their upper structures) must 
lead to an inevitable destruction of the traditional Confucian social order (in 
lower structures). According to the modernists, Confucian culture may suc­
cessfully be the basis for authoritarian or half-authoritarian regimes in the 
People’s Republic of China, Hong Kong, and Singapore; it may also coexist with 
or even support the democratic systems of Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. By 
rejecting liberal individualism Confucianism simultaneously places education 
and tolerance, which are easily congruent with the nature of democratic sys­
tem, high up in the hierarchy of social values.9 101Therefore, the reasons some 
countries in East Asia have adopted democratic systems, while others re­
mained faithful to authoritarian solutions, ought to be sought for somewhere 
else. According to Fukuyama, the significant level of modernization of certain 
societies remains the extremely important factor.'0 On of the most prominent 
researchers in the field of political systems in Asia, Robert A. Scalapino, 
represents nearly identical opinions on the influence of modernization 
processes on the shape of political systems of East Asia." Economic develop­
ment of the region, claims Scalapino, opens the stratification systems, and 
increases the level of mobilization, and the two processes have a positive in­
fluence on the development of democracy.
’ Francis Fukuyama, “Confucianism and Democracy, "Journal of Democracy, Vol. 
6, No. 2/1995, pp. 25-26.
10 Idem, The Illusion of Asian Exceptionalism, in: Larry Diamond and Marc F. 
Plattner (eds.), Democracy in East Asia, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1998, pp. 224-225.
11 Robert A. Scalapino, A Tale of Three Systems, in: Larry Diamond and Marc F. 
Plattner (eds.), Democracy in..., p. 230.
Marc F. Plattner looks at the modernization process from a slightly differ­
ent perspective, and points out that democratic regimes are a kind of continu­
ation of liberalism. According to Plattner, this indicates that although liberal 
concepts in East Asia at the threshold of the ‘third wave’ of democratization 
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seemed almost absent, they would grow with strength along with the progress 
of economic development, and in turn generate the modernizational political 
transformation.12 Therefore, as Gerald L. Curtis claims, although the traditional 
East Asian society is not yet a civil society, a special effect of synergy should be 
expected. Economic development will contribute to the emergence of democ­
ratic institutions, which will stimulate the ‘civic virtues’ of the inhabitants of 
the region. The development of ‘civil consciousness’ will, in turn, contribute to 
the strengthening of the stability of democratic systems themselves.13
12 Marc F. Plattner, "From Liberalism to Liberal Democracy,” Journal of Democ­
racy, Vol. 10, No. 3/1999, pp. 130-133.
13 Gerald L. Curtis, A Recipe for Democratic Development, in: Larry Diamond and 
Marc F. Plattner (eds.), Democracy in..., p. 222.
14 Lucian W. Pye, Civility, Social Capital, and Civil Society in Asia, in: Robert 1. Rot- 
berg (ed.), Patterns of Social Capital: Stability and Change in Historical Perspective, Cam­
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 381.
15 Samuel P. Huntington, “After Twenty Years: The Future of Third Wave,” 
Journal of Democracy, Vol. 8, No. 4/1997, p. 10.
16 Fareed Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 
6/1997, p. 28.
Researches who remain faithful to the second of the above-mentioned op­
tions, i.e. the ‘cultural relativism,’ claim - opposing the supporters of moderni­
zation - that East Asia is characterized by durability of authoritarian political 
systems originating from the historically and culturally rooted hierarchical 
social order. By no means will they disappear along with the modernization of 
economic systems or changes in the social structure caused by modernization. 
On the contrary. The rapid dynamics in stratification systems will cause an 
increase of subjective sense of threat among individuals. In search of safety, 
societies will even more evidently show the need for a strong central power.14
Huntington remarks, assuming a similar point of view, that East Asian 
states have always needed tradition which would consolidate the state, there­
fore the concept of the rights of an individual typical for liberalism never had 
the chance to be present there. What is more important, the Confucian 
thought identifies the society with the state, and therefore leaves no space for 
social groups, autonomous towards the state. Undoubtedly, as relativists claim, 
this feature of the traditional Asian culture is completely out of line with the 
potential development of democracy in the region.15
Moderate supporters of cultural relativism most pessimistically estimate 
the chances for the Asian democracies to approximate the European proto­
type. Fareed Zakaria claims that even if East Asian countries manage to over­
come the threshold of institutional democratization, it will not necessarily 
bring about the constitutional liberalism.16 It may mean that instead of the 
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expected ‘third wave’ non-liberal and, in fact, authoritarian political solutions 
may appear behind the facade of democracy.
Daniel A. Bell, one of the leading researchers in the field of the systems of 
values in the Confucian domain, sets three characteristics of political culture, 
conducive to the development of non-liberal systems. These are: the lack of 
neutral state, techno-paternalism, and state-steered public space together 
with a dependent civil society. Where traditional Western liberalism recog­
nizes the citizens’ right to choose the way the power should be wielded, in a 
state devoid of neutrality it is the government that decides about the model of 
doing politics which is most suitable for itself. Thus, the government may free­
ly make attempts to interfere in every aspect of the citizens’ lives of reasons 
known only to itself. Under the rule of techno-paternalism a non-liberal coun­
try develops a complex bureaucratic apparatus based on rational principles. 
Thus, the government creates an administrative system similar to the man­
agement of enterprises. Although it is strictly expected to abide by the rules of 
law, it does not leave much space for the citizens at large to make any deci­
sions. When the public space is steered, the existence of civil society, if it is 
possible anyway, is put under a strict control of the administration apparatus, 
and all manifestations of public activity of the citizens are rigorously ra­
tioned.17
17 Daniel A. Be 11, David Brown, Kanishka Jayasuriya and David M. Jones, To­
ward Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995, pp. 163-167.
Both the above-mentioned perspectives on the issue of democracy in East 
Asia, i.e. modernizational and relativistic concepts, assess the dynamics of 
changes in the region's political systems through the prism of values con­
nected with the tradition of liberal democracy. The third concept - called the 
communitarian perspective - attempts, at least formally, to eliminate the lib­
eral analytic framework. It also searches for traits of democratization in East 
Asia, and attempts to mark out its framework in a way different and detached 
from the liberal tradition. The communitarian definition, contrary to the lib­
eral, attempts to define the role of the state. According to the latter, the exis­
tence of the state is based on a social contract of independent individuals. 
Hence, the aim of state institutions, somehow by definition, is to promote and 
defend the fundamental individual political rights. However, in the communi­
tarian version, the state is primarily to represent the interest of the society as 
a whole. Its institutions are set only in the context of communal values. There­
fore, the perspective assumes that fulfilling collective aims is prioritized over 
the interest of an individual. Therefore, the state is identical with the social 
interest, and has the right to expect all citizens to sacrifice themselves for 
reaching a common goal. Supporters of the communitarian tradition often 
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differentiate between politics in its broader term and a narrowly understood 
party politics. The ‘distribution of power’ in a liberal sense among institutional 
actors of the political scene should be, according to them, replaced with an 
increased participation of all members of the community.18 Supporters of this 
trend admit that although Confucianism is not necessarily the basis for legiti­
mization of authoritarian regimes, it can hardly be ascribed the ability to de­
velop, on its grounds, the Western concepts of human rights or the principles 
of liberal democracy. In fact, according to communitarians, when it comes to 
the Confucian thought, we are dealing with a number of ideas such as ‘social 
basis of power’ or ‘power wielded for the society,’ which are close to some 
principles of procedural democracy in Western societies. Therefore, comunitar- 
ians suggest that Confucian culture and the broader Asian system of values are 
the basis that will allow for the interpretation of a fundamental definition of 
liberal democracy, and make it available for the societies of East Asia.19
18 Henry Tam, Communitarianism: A New Agenda for Politics and Citizenship, New 
York: New York University Press, 1998, pp. 12-18.
” Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel A. Bell (eds.), The East Asian Challenge for Human 
Right, Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1999; Theodore de Bary, Confucianism and 
Human Rights in China, in: Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds.), Democracy in..., 
pp. 42-56; Theodore de Bary and Weiming Tu (eds.), Confucianism and Human Rights, 
New York: Columbia University Press, 1998; Russell A. Fox, "Confucian and Communi­
tarian Responses to Liberal Democracy,” The Review of Politics, Vol. 59, No. 3/1997, pp. 
561-592; David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, The Democracy of the Dead: Dewey, Confucius, 
and the Hope for Democracy in China, Chicago: Open Court. Hall & Ames, 1999.
A number of ideological concepts described as the program of ‘Asian val­
ues’ is also ranked among the communitarian outlook on the issue of democra­
tization of Asia. There is no unanimous canon for what the program is. The 
basic assumptions of the program were concentrated on the necessity for the 
rebirth of the traditional system of values - the return to the Asian ‘roots’ of 
social identity. They were accompanied not only by the conviction of diversity, 
but also the ‘superiority’ of Asian social systems based on communal values, 
where the interest of the society takes precedence over the interest of an indi­
vidual, over the ‘American’ individualism. The concepts of ‘Asian values,’ 
which is proven by the form of political discourse on this issue, may be found 
in a number of articles, speeches, interviews, and books. Elite Asian politicians, 
who are assumed the ‘founding fathers’ of the new ideological trend, quite 
quickly joined the discourse. The concepts of Asian values were proclaimed by 
the Prime Minister of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew as a new ideology of the restor­
ing Asia, and later they were successfully taken up by the leader of Malaysia - 
Mahathir bin Mohamad.
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The Bangkok Declaration, signed by the leaders of a number of Asian 
countries, was an attempt to codify the core of the ideology of‘Asian values.' It 
concentrated on a few mutually related issues which ought to be mentioned. 
Firstly, it raised a simple cultural argument, according to which human rights 
were to result from a particular historical, social, economic, and political con­
text - i.e. that in terms of civilization they have a specific character - and lose 
their universalisms in the particular conditions, the modern Asian societies 
live in. Secondly, the declaration also contains argumentation referring to the 
communitarian nature of Asian societies. According to the argumentation, 
duties for the family and the community are the core of social life, as opposed 
to Western individualism and atomistic understanding of the society. If the 
interest of the community dominates the interest of an individual, exposure of 
the rights of an individual constitutes a significant threat for the order and 
harmonious functioning of the society. The declaration also contains an argu­
ment of the tradition of voluntary subjugation of the citizens to the discipline 
in all aspects of social life, including family relations, relations at work and 
politics. Self-discipline of Asian societies, according to the authors of the dec­
laration, results from a culturally conditioned need to be successful in the eco­
nomic dimension. From these assumptions comes a conclusion that social and 
economic rights take precedence over civil and political rights, with an em­
phasis on the ‘right to development.' Lastly, the declaration raises an organic 
argument which draws attention to the fact that the state and society consti­
tute an indivisible body - with the government wielding power for the com­
mon good. As a direct consequence of this statement, all criticism towards the 
government goes against the interest of the society as a whole.20 The politi­
cized nature of the debate on Asian values did not, however, result from the 
pure distinctness of basic cultural elements. Asian values in their ideological 
sense were often treated instrumentally, and among ‘communitarians’ them­
selves they were heavily criticized.21
20 For example see Mahathir bin Mohamad in: Asiaweek on September 8, 
1995, p. 42.
21 Krzysztof Gawlikowski, “Poglądy Mahathira bin Mohamada,” Res Publica 
Nowa No. 3/2003; idem, “Problem ‘wartości azjatyckich’. Uwagi o koncepcjach Maha­
thira bin Mohamada,” Azja Pacyfik, Vol. 2, Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 1999; 
Mahathir bin Mohamad, “Rozważania o wartościach azjatyckich,” Azja Pacyfik, Vol. 
2, Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 1999.
When analyzing the above-mentioned theoretical perspectives empirical­
ly, the following versions might be assumed, if the modernizational perspec­
tive was true, the values of traditional social culture should diminish, and lib­
eral democracy and its institutional frameworks should be gradually growing 
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in strength. In case the second hypothesis is correct, no significant changes in 
the political systems of Asian states should accompany maintaining constant 
framework of the Confucian tradition. Lastly, if the communitarian model was 
to become the most representative, significant changes in democratization of 
political structures should be accompanied by traditional systems of values. 
Undoubtedly, the issue deserves to be looked at more carefully.
Confucianism and democratization in research
The discourse on the relation between traditional Confucian values and pro­
cesses of democratization in East Asia receives a growing interest of research­
ers. Apart from deliberation on the theoretical nature, some of the researchers 
decided to conduct full fieldwork which would verify the nature of correlation 
between the models and the real attitude of respondents. American scholar, 
David I. Hitchcock, from the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(Washington, D.C.), was one of the first researchers who raised the issue of 
Asian values in the context of their influence on the organization of the system 
of social relations and the organization of political life in modern countries of 
East Asia.22
22 David I. Hitchcock, Asian Values and the United States: How Much Conflict?, 
Washington: CSIS 1994; a detailed translation of fragments from Hitchcock’s work was 
also included in: Adam W. Jelonek (ed.), Wietnamczycy: systemy wartości, stereotypy 
Zachodu, Warszawa: Scholar, 2004.
In his research on Asian values, he asked a hundred respondents from the 
U.S. and seven countries of East Asia (China, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, 
Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand) to choose, from two lists, the personal and 
social values or features that, according to them, were particularly important 
for the people in their countries. Two out of the five most often chosen values 
or personal features, as well as two out of the six ‘most popular’ social values, 
were put on the list of priorities of both Asians and Americans. The biggest 
differences in the frequency of American and Asian responses concerned the 
relative significance they ascribed to “orderly society,” “personal freedom," 
and “rights of the individual.” The first of the above-mentioned answers was 
marked as “particularly important” by 11 percent Americans and 71 percent 
Asians, the second - 82 percent and 32 percent respectively, and the third - 78 
percent and 29 percent respectively.
Further in his research, Hitchcock asked a hundred respondents form East 
Asian countries and 18 Americans to carefully look through a list of 12 differ­
ent practices related to governing. The respondents were to circle positions 
which according to them people in their countries considered “the most im­
portant,” and mark those which were considered “less important." Hitchcock 
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emphasizes that while arranging the list of practices he had been avoiding 
such expressions as the ‘right to’ or ‘freedom of,’ and attempted to select 
words which would allow for the highest possible level of objectivity.
Figure 1.1. Social values in Hitchcock’s research: Asians and Americans
Figure 1.2. Personal values in Hitchcock’s research: Asians and Americans
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Three out of twelve positions, i.e. “freedom of speech,” “choosing leaders 
in free elections,” and “the lack of discrimination due to race, religious belief, 
skin color, sex, age or physical disability” were marked as “the most impor­
tant” by a 100 percent Americans. In turn, Asian respondents marked the fol­
lowing answers as the most important: “free elections,” “fair payment (in rela­
tion to local conditions),” “suitable work conditions and hours,” and then “the 
lack of discrimination.” In comparison to Americans, Asians attached a great 
importance to social order, respect for authorities, harmony which maintains 
the ‘status quo,’ and respect for learning. At the same time, both Americans and 
Asians often marked hard work, honesty, self-realization, responsibility of 
public officers, and openness to new ideas.
It seems interesting that over 50 percent of the Asian respondents marked 
as many as nine practices as “the most important,” whereby six of them were 
marked as “the most important” by over 60 percent of the Asian respondents. 
The following three positions were the least often marked by the respondents 
from East Asia: “gathering and organizing in groups for various reasons,” 
"quick trial,” and “the possibility to refuse to testify against someone."
The practices from Hitchcock’s list may be classified into three categories: 
political, legal, and economic. Respondents from four Asian countries were 
highly interested in economic practices. “Free elections" were marked as “the 
most important” by over 70 percent of the respondents from the entire region. 
In the case of China, however, 39 percent respondents marked them as “the 
most important" or “less important,” and 22 percent did not give any answer. 
“Freedom of speech” was marked as "the most important,” apart from Singa­
pore, by 67 percent respondents from Asia. “The impossibility of being impris­
oned without a charge,” and “receiving defense during trial” were marked as 
“the most important” by over 50 percent of the respondents from all Asian 
countries, again with the exception of Singapore, where prolonged imprison­
ment without a trial is legal.
In the summary of his research, Professor Hitchcock roughly agreed with 
the advocates of the ‘relativistic’ opinion on the dependence between democ­
ratization processes and the traditional set of ‘Asian values.’ According to 
Hitchcock, the results of the research confirmed the essential distinctness in 
the hierarchy of values among the Asian and American respondents. Apart 
from the obvious distinctnesses in the sphere relating to “the practices con­
nected with governing” the image emerging from Hitchcock’s surveys shows a 
fundamental distinctness in what he calls “the world of hidden beliefs” in the 
issue of personal and social values, and the meaning of some human rights. 
Hitchcock’s research echoed far and wide in the community of the researchers 
in the field of the issue of ‘Asian values,’ and their results have repeatedly 
served as an indication towards the validity of different social and political 
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systems in the civilizations of the West and East Asia, and probably different 
directions of their evolutions.
However, the research has raised certain serious methodological objec­
tions, which could have had a significant influence on the excessively univer­
sal nature of the obtained results. The sample analyzed by Hitchcock was too 
small to allow for forming far-reaching judgment. Hitchcock, who is American, 
conducted his research personally, which undoubtedly had an influence on the 
answers. Moreover, the surveys, which Hitchcock has never been hiding, were 
conducted among the ‘opinion leaders’ - politicians, representatives of aca­
demic and business circles. The ‘opinion leaders’ in the East Asian countries, 
apart from a few exceptions, during answering the questions, were in the mid­
dle of a great intercivilizational ideological discussion, when the universalism 
of the Western values was opposed to the relativism in comprehending 
the world, proposed by the East. The circles perforce presented an image of the 
system of values they wanted to see in their own societies. This ‘programmat­
ic’ subjectivity of the investigated group was surely not conducive to showing 
the real state of affairs, and the level of rooting of traditional Asian values in 
modern societies of the region.
In 2003, on the basis of similar research instruments, a group of students 
from the Institute of Sociology at the Warsaw University together with the 
Faculty of Social Studies at the National Hanoi University, under my guidance, 
took up a research on the image of the system of values of the students of the 
Hanoi University. In our research, we resigned from civilizational overgeneral­
izations used by Hitchcock, and fixed a simpler project framework. Full ano­
nymity was observed in the research. Moreover, the surveys in Vietnam were 
conducted by local coworkers, and the respondents were informed that the 
sole organizer of the research was the Faculty of Social Studies at the National 
Hanoi University, which allowed for a limitation of possible distortions of the 
answers.23
23 For details see Adam W. J e 1 o n e k (ed.) Wietnamczycy: systemy wartości, stereoty­
py Zachodu, Warszawa: Scholar, 2004.
The analysis of the results of our research indicates significant similari­
ties, but also significant differences, in understanding the hierarchy of values 
in relation to the published results of David Hitchcock's surveys. The discrep­
ancies, often exceeding 30 percent, have an impact on the configuration of the 
sets of values mostly marked as important. And so, although among personal 
values in Hitchcock’s research the most often marked were: “hard work,” “re­
spect for learning,” “personal achievements,” “honesty,” and “self-discipline,” 
our research - together with “hard work” and “respect for learning,” - pointed 
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at “independence," “achieving success in life,” “helping others,” and “hones­
ty” as the most often marked values.
As a rule, the traditional pattern of an individual is questioned only by a 
radical decline in understanding of the meaning of “self-discipline” as a signif­
icant value.24 On the other hand, in the eyes of the young Vietnamese, values 
indicating an exceptional role of the community, such as “helping others” and 
respect for parents, fundamental in the Confucian tradition, turn out to be 
even more important than in the eyes of the Asian elites surveyed by Hitch­
cock.
24 Karin Tomala, “Prawa człowieka w Chińskiej Republice Ludowej,” in: Karin 
Tomala and Krzysztof Gawłowski (eds.), Chiny. Przemiany państwa i społeczeństwa 
w okresie reform 1978-2000, Warszawa: Trio, 2001, p. 149.
Are we, therefore, witnessing a significant change in the self-definition of 
individuals, and in perceiving social reality? It seems that the results of the 
researches confirm the thesis: it is proved by the high position of the ascribed 
variable “achieving success in life.” The value was marked by the respondents 
almost as often as “hard work,” “respect for learning,” and “self-reliance.” 
(East Asian elites surveyed by Hitchcock marked “success” significantly less 
often than “hard work:” 29 percent and 76 percent respectively). What could 
be, however, the meaning of such a change?
Basic personal values proving the vitality of tradition, including the Con­
fucian tradition, seem to be still preserved in the Vietnamese society. Still, a 
significant part of our respondents marked out “hard work,” “respect for 
learning,” “self-reliance,” “honesty," and “obedience and respect for parents.” 
And although in comparison to the results obtained by D. Hitchcock, values 
such as “hard work,” “respect for learning,” and “honesty" were marked 
slightly less often, there are no grounds to claim that this group of values sig­
nificantly diminished in importance. Especially, if it is assumed that although 
the age and status of the people surveyed by Hitchcock was conducive rather 
to conservatism in estimating the social importance of traditional values, the 
young age of the surveyed Vietnamese should rather have been conducive to a 
certain radicalization of their opinions.
From the point of view of the perspective of the outlook on the existing 
relations between the traditional system of Confucian values and moderniza­
tion processes the results of the Vietnamese research, in comparison to the 
analysis conducted by Hitchcock, may lead to slightly different conclusions. 
We are dealing here with a process where traditional values are supplemented 
with new values. Therefore, we receive a coherent and logical entirety where 
‘traditional values’ not only are not superseded by new ones, characteristic of 
the West, but increase in durability through relating them to goals offered by 
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the new reality. Therefore, duties determined by tradition in this model are 
related to rights - in this case to the right to achieve success. Success, in the 
eyes of the young Vietnamese, is not unavoidably related to appreciation of 
the role of individual achievements. The individualization of goals - evident in 
pursuing one’s own success and in being aware of having rights - does not 
have to be followed by the individualization of actions, although the theoreti­
cians of individualism often associate individual perspective of goals with an 
individual way of acting (self-controllability, self-reliance).25 In the Vietnamese 
conditions it is still group action - treated not only as a value itself, but as a 
comfortable and effective means of action - that seems a pragmatically more 
convenient way to realize own goals.
25 See Peter L. Berger, Rewolucja kapitalistyczna. Warszawa: Oficyna Naukowa, 
1995, pp. 167-168.
Significant shifts in relation to the results of Hitchcock’s research follow 
also within the limits of a set of social values most often marked as significant. 
Values such as “harmony” and “orderly society,” most highly marked in Hitch­
cock’s research, were superseded by the “rights of community” and “personal 
freedom” in the research conducted in Hanoi. Whereas the variable “respect 
for public servants” was listed the third most often marked in both the re­
searches. A similarly high position is occupied by the variables “respect for the 
authorities” and “openness to new ideas” in both the researches. A significant 
difference (20 percent) in indications to personal freedom resulted in the fact 
that, according to the Vietnamese students, it is not ranked among the set of 
the most significant values. 48 percent of indications to “solving arguments by 
public debate” puts this social value on the fifth place, due to the number of 
indications.
As much as 65 percent of indications to “personal freedom” are an earnest 
of a growing significance of the ethics of law (as compared to 31 percent in 
Hitchcock’s research; in the results of the Vietnamese research it is also the 
most often indicated value). The fact that the surveyed students omitted the 
values which were highly estimated by the respondents in D. Hitchcock’s re­
search, also seems to be equally significant. These values are: “harmony” (28 
percent in comparison to 58 percent in Hitchcock’s research), “orderly socie­
ty” (28 percent in comparison to 71 percent), and “consensus” (12.3 percent in 
comparison to 39 percent). According to the American researcher, particular 
respect for these values constituted the most fundamental feature of the 
‘Asian’ perspective of perceiving the public sphere, and was also the key to 
understand the role of an individual in East Asian society.
Some new research hypotheses take shape in the light of the Vietnamese 
research. A simple version of the ‘relativism’ of political systems emerging 
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from Hitchcock’s research seems to be, in this case, unconfirmed. Global trans­
formations and their reception among the Vietnamese youth seem to prove 
the occurrence of the process of hybridization, i.e. supplementing the tradi­
tional Confucian values with selectively treated values, adopted from the 
world of the ‘liberal’ West. If we limited ourselves only to the level of axiology 
on the analytic ground, the results of the Vietnamese research could have in­
duced us to the communitarian or modernizational option as true. We should 
not forget, however, that both theoretical variants, apart from accepting the 
hybridized nature of the evolution of the system of values, also assumed signif­
icant transformations of the framework of constitutional order, towards the 
universal or at least ‘Asian model of democracy.’ The lack, at least for now, of 
any traits of even a procedural minimum of democracy principles in the Viet­
namese political system forced us to verify our hypotheses in the next re­
search project.
Liberal and Confucian values in Poland and Taiwan
I decided to verify the hypothesis on the communitarian or modernizational 
direction of transformation of democratic values by analyzing the durability of 
the traditional Confucian system of values, in relation to the case of a country 
with established democratic procedures - commonly recognized as one of the 
leaders of Huntington’s ‘third wave’ in Asia, i.e. Taiwan. The research con­
ducted in Taiwan was related to the analysis of the system of values of the 
Polish society - representing the Western culture, where the democratic pro­
cedures, however, appeared more or less at the same time as in the Asian 
counterpart.
Taiwan - one of the famous ‘Asian tigers,’ apart from having spectacular 
economic successes, has become the scene for many transformations in the 
political life over a span of recent years. Rapidly ensuing reforms of the main 
institutions of public life, initiated in 1996, were equivalent to the transforma­
tion of the model of political scene - from an authoritarian state, through dif­
ferent types of transitional stages (‘limited democracy’), towards the full dem­
ocratic system, entirely based on patterns adopted from the West. Such a revo­
lutionary change of the country’s system is considered an unprecedented 
event by political scientists.26
26 Linda Chao and Ramon H. Myers, The First Chinese Democracy: Political Life in 
the Republic of China on Taiwan, Washington: NCC1, 1998; Cal Clark, Taiwan's Develop­
ment: Implications for Contending Political Economy Paradigms (Contributions in Economics 
and Economic History), New York: Columbia University Press, 1998.
In 1949, the activists of the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT), after 
losing to communist forces and fleeing from the mainland China, made an 
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attempt to establish their own strategic stronghold in Taiwan. Only a few ob­
servers believed that anyone would have managed to create an efficiently 
functioning economy and civil administrative structures there, the more so 
build foundations of a democratic system. The concerns, as it turned out, were 
hardly justified. The way the significant changes occurred in the state’s politi­
cal system was also a surprise for the researchers in the field of democratiza­
tion processes. Completely differently from the case of democratic systems in 
Latin America or Eastern Europe, the Taiwanese democratization processes 
took place by a gradual ceding of power by the ruling Nationalist Party (KMT). 
It was the party that initiated significant political reforms. The gradual open­
ing of political scene did not lead, as opposed to the majority of cases of Hun­
tington’s ‘third wave,’ to serious breakdowns of the system of state power, 
neither did it cause a deep economic crisis. Being aware of the slowly rising 
opposition, the authorities connected with KMT willingly initiated political 
liberalization and the gradual sharing of power, and finally crowned the 
process with a complete democratization of the country. It was KMT that ne­
gotiated, struggled for compromises, and reached an agreement with the op­
position parties, making the progress of democratization irreversible. The 
authoritarian party became the key force of the country’s democratization. It 
was thanks to the party that in the 1980s the ban for political parties’ function­
ing was lifted, and basic civic liberties and freedoms were introduced. At the 
end of 1991, first free elections to the National Assembly took place, in Decem­
ber 1992 - to the Parliament (the Legislative Yuan), in December 1994 - the 
first general elections for provinces’ governors, and in March 1996 - the first 
presidential elections. The example of Taiwan seemed significant, since it al­
lowed verifying how the system of values esteemed by the society was similar 
to the liberal pattern, and how close it was to the traditional Confucian model, 
with a simultaneous appliance of the ‘democratic rules of the game.’ Despite 
some reservations about the nature of the Taiwanese democracy and its alleg­
edly ‘Asian’ shape it should be emphatically stated that the constitutional and 
procedural solutions implemented there satisfy all criteria mentioned in the 
normative model of Dahl’s polyarchy - recognized by almost everyone as an 
institutional model of modern democracies.27
” Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, New Haven: Yale Uni­
versity Press, 1971; see also Adam W. Jelonek, Dynamika kryzysu tajwańskiej demokracji. 
W cieniu wyborów prezydenckich i referendum 2004, in: Marian B r o d a and Marek Dziekan 
(eds.), Oblicza Wschodu, Łódź: Instytut Studiów Międzynarodowych UŁ, Elipsa, 2004.
The used research procedure did not differ much from the one adopted in 
the research of 2003. It was based again on the model of survey used before 
in Hitchcock’s work based on the opposition of traditional Confucian values 
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and the idealized liberal values of the West. The Taiwanese research was con­
ducted from October to December 2007 on a quota sample of 418 students (215 
women and 203 men). It embraced the three main academic centers in the city 
(two state universities: the National Taiwan University and National Chengchi 
University, and the private Tamkang University). The second part of the re­
search consisted of surveys conducted on a sample of students at universities 
in Warsaw. In the period from March to May, 463 persons were surveyed, in­
cluding 240 women and 223 men. The research was conducted in the largest 
public universities in the capital, including the University of Warsaw, Warsaw 
University of Technology, Warsaw School of Economics, and the private Bog­
dan Jahski Academy.
Although the conducted research recorded only the actuality of one pe­
riod of time, and therefore did not allow for drawing conclusions about the 
course of the processes of social and modemizational transformations of polit­
ical values, one should expect that during the two decades of democracy sig­
nificant interactions between the sphere of axiology and political praxis 
should have occurred.
Figure 1.3. Personal values in the surveys of students in Taiwan and Poland
The results of the research incline us to draw some interesting conclu­
sions. In the case of personal values, in almost all answers of the Taiwanese 
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respondents, we are dealing with an equal or more frequent indication to val­
ues from the group of the “traditional Confucian values,” than in the case of 
Hitchcock’s research and the research in Hanoi. “Hard work” was marked by 
74.3 percent of the respondents - a little less than in Hitchcock’s research, but 
a lot more than in the case of the Vietnamese research. Indications to such 
typically Confucian values as “respect for learning” - 71.1 percent, “obedience 
to parents” - 41.1 percent, “self-discipline” - 33.2 percent, and “fulfilling duties 
to others” - 47.2 percent, are higher or significantly higher in comparison to 
both the Vietnamese survey and the research conducted by the American 
scholar. The values from the group of the ‘liberal West’ marked as significant 
by the Taiwanese respondents oscillate around those given in the previous 
research in the area of East Asia. 49.2 percent indicated “self-discipline,” 36.3 
percent - “self-realization,” 34.8 percent - “personal achievement,” and 31.7 
percent - “success in life.” It is worth noting that for the comparative group of 
the Polish students, the system of values in many places resembles the para­
doxically idealized model of the ‘traditional Confucian values’ a lot more than 
the model of ‘liberal West.’ In some cases, such as “self-reliance” - 77.3 per­
cent, “fulfilling obligations to others” - 14.6 percent, and individual “success in 
life” - 59.4 percent, the Polish students efficiently ‘catch up’ with the American 
respondents, but in the case of values such as “respect for learning” - 56.4 per­
cent, “hard work” - 52.8 percent, and “obedience to parents” - 32 percent, 
Polish respondents seem, at least in their answers, to be very ‘Confucian.’ Com­
ing back, however, to the analysis of the influence of democratization on a 
hypothetical transformation of the system, it seems that at least in the ob­
served temporal horizon it remained almost unchanged. It should additionally 
be emphasized that in both researches the respondents were students, i.e. 
people born or at least brought up in the framework of a new democratic polit­
ical reality.
The results of the second part of the survey analyzing social values, seem 
even more interesting from the point of view of our reflections on the rela­
tions between the Asian values and liberal democracy. Already at first glance 
we can see that the system of values of the Taiwanese youth in most dimen­
sions does not much stray off the system of values represented by the respon­
dents of Hitchcock’s research or the “Vietnam 2003” research. Values of the 
Confucian group such as “respect for authorities” - 39.1 percent, “harmony” 
- 44 percent, “consensus” - 37.2 percent, and “rights of the society” - 42.4 per­
cent were placed relatively highly, while the values of the liberal group such as 
“solving arguments by the public debate” - 31.6 percent and “thinking of one­
self’ - 25.4 percent were placed fairly low.
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Figure 1.4. Social values among the Taiwanese and Polish students
At the same time, however, one can observe a significant intensification 
of some variables from the group of ‘liberal values’ such as “decisions by ma­
jority” - 46.7 percent, “personal freedom” - 73.3 percent, and “freedom of ex­
pression” - 67.4 percent.
In comparison to the values esteemed by the Polish youth, Taiwanese stu­
dents acknowledged significantly different values from the group of the ‘tradi­
tional Confucian values.’ The largest differences could be observed in ascribing 
importance to such variables as “orderly society” (49 percent), “harmony” (35 
percent), “rights of the society” (27 percent), and “consensus” (29 percent). 
For the Polish respondents, part of the terms proposed in the survey might 
have seemed incomprehensible. Due to their actual absence in public dis­
course, the terms might additionally have subjectively ‘lost’ their meaning. In 
some cases, they could also have been differently interpreted which results 
from a different cultural context (such as “solving arguments by private set­
tlement”). We should, however, focus the attention upon our analysis of de­
pendencies between traditional Confucian values and procedural democracy 
on the fact that most of the values given to the respondents in the ‘liberal’ 
group are considered extremely important in both societies. Whereas differ­
ences, with regard to different cultures and political traditions, seem quite 
insignificant (apart from the variable “decisions made by the majority”). Their 
occurrence may be the result of a deeply rooted Confucian tradition, but other 
alternative explanations may also be found.
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The results of comparative researches in Taipei and Warsaw, as well as 
conclusions drawn from the former researches of Hitchcock and project Viet­
nam 2003, place the issue of political changes occurring in the East Asian coun­
tries in an enticing light. They also sketch an interesting perspective of mutual 
dependencies between Confucianism and liberal democracy, its constitutional 
procedures in the least. It is difficult, relying on the gathered research materi­
al, to entirely believe in the vision of the world of politics in both the civiliza­
tions - liberal West and Confucian East - proposed by cultural relativists. It is 
also difficult to be convinced about the existence of the alleged inner block­
ades for the development of democracy in the traditional systems of Asian 
values, suggested by relativists. Moreover, the research conducted in Taiwan 
shows that the arguments about the communitarian nature of political con­
structs in Asia seem doubtful. Naturally, it is difficult to question the presence 
of community values in Asian societies. In the sphere of personal values, partly 
social values as well, after all they are still quite obviously present in the an­
swers of the Taiwanese respondents. However, we cannot draw an unambig­
uous conclusion - as suggested by the advocates of communitarianism - that 
they shape political systems unidirectionally, since we are also dealing with a 
reverse process. As the Taiwanese research shows, democratic procedures 
undoubtedly adopted from the West very clearly shape the variables, signifi­
cant for political systems, in the systems of values. Moreover, the communita­
rian ‘Asian democracy’ - a characteristic ‘third way’ also proposed by the 
above-mentioned advocates of the ideological version of the Asian values, is an 
underspecified and speculative term, hence it is difficult to put it through a 
rational empirical analysis.
The obtained results may suggest that the modernization model was accu­
rate. However, one should be careful with passing explicit opinions. The binary 
vision of communal hierarchical social reality of the East, opposed to individual­
istic liberal Western society, proposed once by modernists and relativists, and 
referred to by Hitchcock, is already the insufficient context for an accurate anal­
ysis of transformations occurring on the axiological level. Although relying on 
the received statistic data, we can establish the reduction of the impact of tradi­
tional social model based on harmony and social concord, the received data do 
not allow for drawing an unambiguous conclusion that the change, in this case, 
consisted in a clear shift of the respondents’ declarations to the sphere of the 
‘Western system of values.’ The multitude and abundance of relations between 
different aspects of the society’s culture and organization, makes it insufficient 
to talk about them in the categories of adopting models and adapting in the na­
tive culture. In the world which undergoes a constant process of globalization, 
however, there are many different mechanisms that are conducive to popular­
ization of the solutions of procedural democracy, which was often emphasized 
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by the modernists. There is as well a barrier for the spread of the models of 
Western liberal democracy, and almost everyone is aware of that. On the basis 
of the presented research material it is difficult to believe that traditional system 
of values will, however, be the most significant barrier.
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